By Niall Ferguson
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Lloyd George used to be a type of who, as Beaverbrook recalled, attempted to argue that the Germans might ‘pass in basic terms during the furthest southern nook’ and that this is able to indicate ‘a small infraction of neutrality. “You see”, he may say [pointing to a map], “it is barely a little, and the Germans can pay for any harm they do. ”’98 It was once greatly (though wrongly) anticipated, at least, that the Belgians wouldn't demand British assistance, yet might easily factor a proper protest within the occasion of a German passage in the course of the Ardennes.
Eighty. Gebele, Die Probleme, pp. 23f. eighty one. Ibid. , pp. 36ff. eighty two. Ibid. , p. 20. eighty three. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda, p. 23. eighty four. Gebele, Die Probleme, pp. 37f. info in A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 137ff. eighty five. A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook, pp. 146–53. Taylor’s verdict on his hero’s achievements as Minister for info is conspicuously tepid, p. 156. 86. Gebele, Die Probleme, pp. 33f. 87. Bruntz, Allied Propaganda, pp. 8f. , 13ff. ; Albert, Histoire de l. a. presse, p. seventy seven; Bellanger et al. , Histoire générale, pp. 420–27. 88. Koszyk, Deutsche Presse, p.
145–8. This threat used to be mentioned yet disregarded through Bertie: okay. Wilson, coverage of the Entente, pp. 46ff. ; Monger, finish of Isolation, p. 279. four. fingers and males 1. gray, Twenty-Five Years, vol. 1, p. ninety. 2. Stevenson, Armaments, pp. 412, 415, 421. three. Herrmann, Arming of Europe, pp. 228ff. four. Steinberg, ‘Copenhagen Complex’, pp. 27ff. ; Kennedy, ‘German international Policy’, pp. 610f. , 619f. five. Monger, finish of Isolation, p. 12. 6. Amery, lifetime of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. IV, p. 197. 7. F. Fischer, ‘Foreign coverage of Imperial Germany’, p.
With no the battle of attrition at the Western entrance, Britain’s manpower, its economic system and its significantly stronger monetary assets couldn't were dropped at undergo on Germany sufficiently to make sure victory. a much more most probably end result could were a diplomatic compromise (of the kind which Lord Lansdowne truly advocated), wherein Britain ended hostilities in go back for German promises of Belgian integrity and neutrality. That, in any case, have been Bethmann’s aim all alongside. With France overwhelmed and the German provide to revive Belgium to the established order ante nonetheless at the desk, it really is not easy to determine how any British executive may have justified carrying on with a naval and maybe heart japanese battle of unforeseeable period.
P. 112. 129. Strachan, ‘Morale’, p. 391. a hundred thirty. Bickersteth, Bickersteth Diaries, p. 295. 131. Coker, struggle and the 20th Century, p. a hundred and twenty. 132. J. Johnson, 1918, p. 189. 133. Ibid. , pp. 189f. 134. See Förster, ‘Dreams and Nightmares’. one hundred thirty five. Kennedy, ‘Military Effectiveness’, p. 343. 136. Edmonds, brief background, p. 281. 137. Herwig, ‘Dynamics of Necessity’, p. 102. 138. Howard, predicament of the Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 17. 139. Prete, ‘French army battle Aims’, pp. 888–98. eleven. ‘Maximum Slaughter at minimal rate’ 1. Harvey, Collision of Empires, p.